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Abstract
Classical and quantum field theory provide not only realistic examples of extant notions of empirical
equivalence, but also new notions of empirical equivalence, both modal and occurrent. A simple but
modern gravitational case goes back to the 1890s, but there has been apparently total neglect of the sim-
plest relativistic analog, with the result that an erroneous claim has taken root that Special Relativity
could not have accommodated gravity even if there were no bending of light. The fairly recent accep-
tance of nonzero neutrino masses shows that widely neglected possibilities for nonzero particle masses
have sometimes been vindicated. In the electromagnetic case, there is permanent underdetermination
at the classical and quantum levels between Maxwell’s theory and the one-parameter family of Proca’s
electromagnetisms with massive photons, which approximate Maxwell’s theory in the limit of zero photon
mass. While Yang-Mills theories display similar approximate equivalence classically, quantization typi-
cally breaks this equivalence. A possible exception, including unified electroweak theory, might permit a
mass term for the photons but not the Yang-Mills vector bosons. Underdetermination between massive
and massless (Einstein) gravity even at the classical level is subject to contemporary controversy.
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1 Introduction
The question whether there exist empirically indistinguishable but incompatible theories bears on how
tightly empirical constraints from the progress of science might constrain our theorizing. While the issue
of empirical equivalence has been widely discussed, philosophers’ discussions often have involved rather
thin examples, perhaps generating new theory candidates by de-Ockhamizing (replacing one theoretical
entity, perhaps “force,” by some combination of multiple entities such that only that combination plays
a role in the theory, such as “gorce plus morce” [Glymour, 1977]), unmotivated deletion of some regions
of space-time or objects therein while the remainder behaves just as in the mother theory, and the like
[Kukla, 1998]. P. Kyle Stanford argues that resorting to these sorts of examples of underdetermination
that philosophers employ, whether algorithmic or not, is a
devil’s bargain for defenders of underdetermination, for it succeeds only where it gives up
any significant and distinctive general challenge to the truth of our best scientific theories”
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by collapsing scientific underdetermination into the familiar and perhaps insoluble problem of
radical skepticism [Stanford, 2006, p. 12].
While there are interesting issues in the vicinity of those examples, perhaps more interesting and certainly
more novel examples are available in contemporary physics in the context of field theory. To be more
specific, scalar gravity, spinor theories of neutrinos, Maxwell’s electromagnetism, Yang-Mills fields, and
Einstein’s GR, along with their massive relatives, with or without quantization, give examples a number
of interesting meta-theoretic phenomena, including the instability of empirical equivalence under change
of auxiliary hypotheses [Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Leplin, 1997]. Some of these phenomena have been
anticipated in the philosophical literature but without such interesting instantiations; others might not
have been contemplated previously by philosophers.
Empirical equivalence is an issue that plays a key role in arguments about scientific realism. According
to Andre´ Kukla,
[t]he main argument for antirealism is undoubtedly the argument from the underdetermination
of theory by all possible data. Here is one way to represent it: (1) all theories have indef-
initely many empirically equivalent rivals; (2) empirically equivalent hypotheses are equally
believable; (3) therefore, belief in any theory must be arbitrary and unfounded. [Kukla, 1998,
p. 58]
On the question whether there exist incompatible but empirically equivalent theories, so that theories
are underdetermined by data, a large literature exists, but presently there seems to be considerable
disagreement on various points. By “empirical equivalence” I have in mind (unless otherwise qualified)
precise equivalence for all models—not equivalence that might be broken with further experimental
progress or the introduction of differing auxiliary hypotheses, or equivalence that holds in some but not
all physically possible worlds. When I speak of approximate empirical equivalence, once again all models,
not just some, are in view. During the heyday of logical empiricism, many influential people denied
that distinct and incompatible but empirically equivalent theories existed [Glymour, 1970]. Carnap and
Reichenbach had no room empirically equivalent theories, given the verificationist criterion of meaning
[Carnap, 1959]. But not only Quine’s work [Quine, 1975], but also the revival of scientific realism during
the 1960s-70s, led to a revival of belief that distinct and incompatible but empirically equivalent theories
exist. More recently the view that there do exist rival empirically equivalent theories has been somewhat
widely held [Musgrave, 1992, Kukla, 1993, Earman, 2006], in contrast to the earlier positivist view that
empirically equivalent theories say the same thing and so are merely linguistic variants. This work aspires
to address the question of empirically equivalent theories within the context of local relativistic classical
and (to some degree) quantum field theories.
Classical and quantum field theories provide philosophically interesting test cases for both approxi-
mate and exact empirical equivalence of physical theories. This paper considers approximate empirical
equivalence using massless and massive versions of scalar gravity, neutrinos, Maxwell’s electromagnetism,
Yang-Mills field theories (describing the weak and strong nuclear forces), and Einstein’s GR. By “mas-
sive theories,” I have in mind the standard particle physics-based sense, with some abuse of language,
such that the theories’ equations of motion (using the standard potentials, such as appear in the usual
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Lagrangian density, as variables) have a term that is algebraic and linear in the potential (and no zeroth-
order constant term). If a massless scalar field φ typically satisfies the relativistic wave equation
c−2
∂2φ
∂t2
− ∂
2φ
∂x2
= 0, (1)
then a massive scalar field satisfies the Klein-Gordon equation
c−2
∂2φ
∂t2
− ∂
2φ
∂x2
+m2c2h¯−2φ = 0. (2)
The coefficient of the algebraic term has been written as m2c2h¯−2 in anticipation of the use of relativistic
quantum field theory. In units with Planck’s constant (reduced by 2pi) h¯ and the ‘speed of light’ c set to
1 (which I use below), it becomes clear why the phrase “mass term” is used. For a classical theory, the
‘mass term’ involves not a mass, but an inverse length scale. In a quantum context, Planck’s constant can
be used to convert the length-related scale to a mass scale. The length then corresponds to the Compton
wavelength. The Klein-Gordon equation and other massive field theories with Lagrangian densities have
quadratic terms in the potential. Under quantization (if all goes well), the quanta of fields satisfying the
Klein-Gordon equation, such as photons according to Proca’s massive electromagnetism, have a nonzero
rest mass; then light does not travel at the ‘speed of light.’ The fact that light need not travel at the speed
of light sounds paradoxical, but only if one is misled by the distorting character of older operationalist
presentations of relativistic physics. How fast light actually travels and the ‘speed of light’ constant c in
Lorentz transformations need not be equal.
At the classical level, at least the simpler massive theory families have representatives that approxi-
mate their massless relatives arbitrarily well empirically for sufficiently small mass parameters, but the
theoretical properties of massive theories can differ greatly from those of their massless counterparts,
except in the scalar case (and perhaps the spin 1
2
case, for which the above discussion would require
modification to discuss the first-order Dirac equation). For example, the massless electromagnetic, Yang-
Mills and gravitational theories—the last of these being Einstein’s General Relativity (GR) or at any rate
a theory with Einstein’s field equations—have mathematically indeterministic field equations and gauge
freedom, whereas the massive theories in the standard formulation have deterministic field equations.
The fact that the mass of the photon (or vector boson or graviton, mutatis mutandis) is a free parameter
shows that Proca’s massive electromagnetism is not one theory, but an infinite family of theories, one
for each choice of value for the photon mass. This example therefore exemplifies permanent rather than
transient underdetermination. However, there is no possibility of identifying supposedly rival theories as
really the same theory, because all theories involved (Maxwell’s and the various massive electromagnetic
theories, for example) are empirically inequivalent. Under quantization, the massive electromagnetic
theory remains healthy and continues to approximate its massless relative arbitrarily well, thus giving
an example of underdetermination in a significant quantum field theory.
The quantized massive Yang-Mills theories (excepting theories with the mass term pertaining to
an Abelian sector) and quantized gravitational theories are theoretically problematic, and some argue
that classical massive gravity is also defective. This phenomenon of a good classical theory that goes
bad under quantization resembles or exemplifies Laudan and Leplin’s notion of instability of empirical
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equivalence under change of auxiliary hypotheses [Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Leplin, 1997]. Here I have
in mind taking quantization (or the lack thereof) as something like an auxiliary hypothesis combined
somehow with one of the above mentioned field theories, construed in some skeletal form that is neither
classical nor quantum.
Explicit and fairly realistic physical theories interrelated through advanced mathematics should yield
insights not as readily available from the traditional discussions of abstract theory formulations T1 and
T2 related by simple logical formulas. Earman has made a similar point in the context of determinism:
If philosophers had spent less time trying to achieve for determinism the superficial ‘preci-
sion’ afforded by formal symbolic notation and had spent more time studying the content of
physical theories they might have confronted the truly fascinating substantive challenges that
determinism must face in classical and relativistic physics. [Earman, 1986, p. 21]
The fruitfulness of particle physics for the question of underdetermination reinforces the importance,
recently urged by others [Brown, 2005, Ladyman et al., 2007], of doing the philosophy of real physics in
its detail and richness.
2 Types of Inexact Empirical Equivalence
The most common version of empirical equivalence discussed by philosophers is the case of exact empirical
equivalence for all models of two theories. The potential interest of such a scenario is evident: obviously
there is no chance in any nomologically possible world that experimental progress will resolve the debate,
while settling it on theoretical grounds might also be difficult. However, this scenario runs the risk that the
two supposedly rival theories are in fact one and the same theory in different guises. Such identification
was often made by those influenced by logical empiricism. A related weaker claim is made today by
John Norton, namely, that for theories for which the “observational equivalence can be demonstrated by
arguments brief enough to be included in a journal article . . . we cannot preclude the possibility that the
theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.” [Norton, 2008, p. 17] Norton evidently has
in mind journal articles in the philosophy of science, not physics or some other science [Norton, 2008,
p. 33]. While Norton aims to deny that the underdetermination of theories by data is generic and that
philosophers’ algorithmic rivals carry much force, I aim to show that there are some serious candidates
for underdetermination that arise from within real physics and that have not been discussed much, if at
all, by philosophers. Thus there is no real disagreement, except perhaps an emphasis on whether a glass
of water is partly empty or partly full. I make no inductive claim (which Norton would dispute) that
these examples imply that all theories are always underdetermined by evidence. However, the examples
available from real physics do seem sufficiently widespread and interesting that it might well frequently
be the case that scientific, or rather physical, theories are permanently underdetermined by data. It
is therefore helpful to observe that the physics literature suggests by example several slightly weaker
notions of empirical equivalence that, being weaker, are immune to the strategy of being identified as
one and the same theory and hence not rivals, yet strong enough that there is no realistic prospect for
distinguishing the two theories empirically.
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Among philosophers the question has been raised what to make of the many empirically equivalent
(or nearly equivalent) theory-candidates or formulations in gravitation, both for Newtonian gravity and
for theories employing Einstein’s equations [Jones, 1991, Lyre and Eynck, 2003, Bain, 2004]. Are the
several Newtonian (or Einsteinian) theory-candidates just formulations of the same theory, or are they
rivals? If they are rivals, are some of these theories better than others? Especially because some versions
of both the Newtonian and Einsteinian gravities have flat space-time with absolute objects and a gravi-
tational force, while others employ curved space-time, the theory candidates’ ontologies and explanatory
mechanisms vary rather widely, despite the complete or nearly complete empirical equivalence between
the two approaches. This choice takes up the issue (discussed by Lotze, Poincare´, and Reichenbach) of
the equivalence between curved geometry and flat geometry with universal forces.
The particle physics literature since the 1930s, however, takes up the issue in a more detailed and
vastly more physically plausible way in the context of gravitation, based on standard principles of special
relativistic field theory such as (of course) Lorentz invariance and the absence of negative-energy degrees
of freedom [Pitts and Schieve, 2001, Boulanger and Esole, 2002] (and see references especially to Fierz
and Pauli, Gupta, Kraichnan, Thirring, Halpern, Feynman, Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, Weinberg,
Deser, and van Nieuwenhuizen in the former).
I point out that this work extends and completes the physical leg of Einstein’s double strategy in
pursuit of his field equations [Einstein and Grossmann, 1913]. The physical leg of Einstein’s double
strategy involved, besides an analogy to electromagnetism, a quest for gravitational field equations given
by some second-order differential operator equated to the total stress-energy, including gravitational
stress-energy, with the gravitational equations by themselves entailing stress-energy conservation. Ein-
stein’s equations are in fact logically equivalent to a suitable collection of such laws [Anderson, 1967],
corresponding to the conservation of uncountably many energy-momenta [Pitts, 2010]. While Einstein
retrospectively described his physical strategy as a failure, recent historical scholarship has called atten-
tion to its importance [Norton, 1989, Janssen, 2005, Janssen and Renn, 2007], though without noticing
the connection to later particle physics work. (Particle physicists generally have not noticed, either.)
It is worth noting that philosophers’ assessments of conventionality in geometry, especially the negative
assessment common since the 1970s [Putnam, 1975], generally did not keep up with developments in
particle physics since 1938. It is also noteworthy that a wholehearted to commitment to thinking of
gravitation geometrically tends to constrict the imagination by rendering it nearly impossible to con-
ceive of the massive variants of GR to be considered below. By contrast, particle physicists’ viewing
Einstein’s equations as describing a self-interacting spin 2 field immediately suggests that the question
whether a massive spin 2 theory might also yield interesting theories of gravity. This question was in-
deed pursued from that time [Fierz and Pauli, 1939, Tonnelat, 1941, de Broglie, 1943, Tonnelat, 1944a,
Tonnelat, 1944b, Petiau, 1944, Petiau, 1945]. Thus the question of massive vs. massless spin 2 theories
of gravity as a test case for underdetermination has reached philosophers 70 years after it became a
common theme in particle physics. A mind-set that obscures interesting questions for seven decades
is worth challenging. It is therefore appropriate to call philosophers’ attention to the particle physics
tradition.
In any case, the many different prima facie ontologies for gravitation with Einstein’s field equations
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might embarrass scientific realists, who presumably wish to invest the fields used with (meta)physical
significance. An incomplete list of formulations found in the literature on GR (construed in the physicists’
broad and vague sense) reveals a host formulations in terms of different variables and even different
numbers of variables. For curved space-time Einsteinian formulations, there are still many different
choices of primitive fields from which to choose, with different numbers of components. To mention just
some (excluding spinor formulations, for example), one has the typical metric formulation (itself non-
unique in Lagrangian density between, e.g. the Hilbert R Lagrangian density with second derivatives
of the metric and the Einstein ΓΓ Lagrangian density merely quadratic in the Christoffel symbols,1 and
other choices [Pons, 2003] for example, as well as in the choice of variables between the metric gµν , its
inverse gµν , and uncountably many densitized relatives of each); the ADM 3 + 1 split with a spatial
metric hij = gij (lower case Latin indices running from 1 to 3), lapse function N and shift vector β
i
[Misner et al., 1973]; Ashtekar’s “new variables” for the modern canonical quantum gravity project (a
densitized triad-connection version of an ADM split) [Jacobson and Romano, 1992]; Christian Møller’s
orthonormal tetrad formalism [Møller, 1964]; the Einstein-‘Palatini’ metric-connection formalism (which
is not due to Palatini [Ferraris et al., 1982]); a metric-connection-Lagrange multiplier formalism that
explains why the metric-connection formalism works [Ray, 1975]; a tetrad-connection formalism that
derives rather than postulates the vanishing of the connection’s torsion [Papapetrou and Stachel, 1978];
and the Peres-Katanaev conformal metric density-scalar density formalism [Peres, 1963]. This last set of
variables, though rarely used and little known, turns out to be privileged for Anderson’s absolute objects
project because it uses no irrelevant fields (in a fairly well defined sense) and uses only irreducible
geometric objects; the failure to use such variables leads to bad performance in inspecting GR for
absolute objects [Pitts, 2006]. Roger Jones identified four formulations of Newtonian gravity; with so
many choices of fields available even within geometrical approaches to Einstein’s equations, as well as
(for example) both geometrical and “spin 2” options [Lyre and Eynck, 2003, Pitts and Schieve, 2004]
(and the long list above), one sympathizes with Jones’s question “realism about what?” [Jones, 1991].
In what should the scientific realist believe in order to be a realist about gravitation in light of current
physics? Ernan McMullin’s claim [McMullin, 1991] (with which Stanford sympathizes [Stanford, 2006,
p. 16]) that mechanics and theoretical physics generally are anomalously difficult for scientific realism
has some basis.
Apart from some exceptions of perhaps little physical importance (such as solutions of an Ashtekar for-
mulation with a degenerate metric, for example), the various sets of variables for GR (broadly construed
in the fashion of physicists) are empirically equivalent in the sense that all or most solutions of one set of
equations are suitably related (not always one-to-one) with solutions in other sets of variables. Physicists
are generally not tempted to regard the resulting theory formulations as distinct theories, partly because
their criteria for physical reality are attuned to this mathematical interrelation. Each description comes
with an adequate recipe for distinguishing the physically meaningful from the descriptive fluff, and no
1In the last few decades [Regge and Teitelboim, 1974], physicists have become less cavalier about discarding boundary terms
and regarding Lagrangians differing by divergences as equivalent. Boundary terms are related to the functional differentiability
of the Hamiltonian, so a choice of boundary terms imposes boundary conditions and hence limits the models included by the
theory.
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further ontological questions are typically asked or answered. Physicists are also quite comfortable with
a certain amount of vagueness or merely implicit specificity. For example, is a given energy condition,
such as the weak energy condition [Wald, 1984], part of GR or not? The answer to that question de-
pends, at least, on whether ‘realistic’ matter fields satisfy the condition; but whether a certain kind of
matter is realistic is malleable in light of both empirical factors (such as the apparent observation of dark
energy in the late 1990s) and theoretical factors (such as recognition that seemingly tame matter fields or
quantum fields violate an energy condition hitherto regarded as important) [Barcelo and Visser, 2002].
GR for physicists is in effect a cluster of theories sharing a hard core including Einstein’s equations,
while partially overlapping in including or failing to include various additional claims with various de-
grees of importance, not unlike a Lakatosian research program [Lakatos, 1970] (see also [Ellis, 2007]).2
Perhaps Arthur Fine would commend to philosophers the physicists’ approach, which sounds something
like his Natural Ontological Attitude that there is no distinctively philosophical question about the real
existence of entities employed in scientific theories, so neither realism nor anti-realism is an appropriate
doctrine [Fine, 1986]. Physicists typically assume some sort of mathematical equivalence as necessary
and sufficient for two formulations to be the same theory (though strict equivalence is not always re-
quired). Lawrence Sklar discusses a strategy along these lines, which seems not unreasonable if we have
no familiarity with the theory’s entities apart from theory itself [Sklar, 1985].
If Fine’s call to abstain from metaphysical questions goes unheeded, then the variety in choices of fun-
damental variables suggests a variety of mutually incompatible ontologies and explanatory mechanisms.
Does space-time really carry a metric only? Does it have a set of four vector fields in terms of which
the metric can be defined (and thus make those vectors “orthonormal” at the end of the day)? Does it
have a set of orthonormal vector fields with the extra local Lorentz group quotiented out? (What would
it be for such a thing to exist, anyway?) Does space-time carry a metric and an a priori independent
connection that happens to match “on-shell”(that is, using some or all of the Euler-Lagrange field equa-
tions) the torsion-free Levi-Civita connection determined by the metric? Or is the connection simply
defined in terms of the metric, so that the modal force of its metric-compatibility and lack of torsion is
logical necessity? Similar questions could be asked about electromagnetism, as Julian Schwinger’s least
action principle, formulated in terms of the vector potential Aµ and a priori independent field strength
Fµν [Schwinger, 1953], shows. Alan Musgrave, it should be noted, does not despair of answering Jones’s
question regarding what realists should be realists about in gravity [Musgrave, 1992], but a full answer
will require more detailed treatment than Musgrave gives.
If one does wish to ask the metaphysician’s question about what contemporary physical theories
assert to exist, then some criterion for choosing among the many formulations of GR is needed. On such
2Another possible view is to identify GR with Einstein’s equations, and allow the various further specifications to count
as sectors within GR. Such a view has the consequence, it would seem, of making the ontology of GR indeterminate without
specifying which sector one has in mind, which seems unhelpful. It also suggests that if some of the sectors are physically
possible, then all of them are; but one might well think that only globally hyperbolic space-times, for example, are possible, or
that they are much closer to the actual world than non-globally hyperbolic space-times. A standard job of a physical theory is to
identify physically possible and impossible worlds. Bundling together what might be physically impossible with the physically
possible in a single theory thus arguably misses an important role for theories.
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matters, the Andersonian tradition [Anderson, 1967, Friedman, 1983], with some friendly amendments
[Pitts, 2006], is perhaps the best guide available, as suggested above. Anderson insisted on eliminating
irrelevant fields. The friendly amendments insist on eliminating locally irrelevant parts of fields—using
only local sections when global sections are not needed, to use the modern bundle-speak—and using only
irreducible geometric objects. The resulting collection of fields is such that all geometric objects needed
in the theory can be derived from the fundamental fields but not from any smaller set of fields. The
outcome for GR is that the fundamental variables are a conformal metric density (or its inverse) and a
scalar density of arbitrary nonzero weight; the metric and connection have no independent existence, but
are defined in terms of these two irreducible geometric objects. There is no orthonormal basis of vectors,
even with spinor fields present.
There are various relationships that might obtain between nearly empirically equivalent theories.
The following list is intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, but the variety of options that
have genuine physical examples is already striking. A modal sort of near equivalence is this: theory
T1 has all the models (or “worlds” for variety) of T2, but T1 has some additional models as well. If
expressed in terms of axioms, T1 is logically weaker than T2. An interesting example would be to consider
GR with the possible further requirement of global hyperbolicity [Wald, 1984]. Consider GR without
the requirement of global hyperbolicity as T1 and GR with global hyperbolicity as T2. Clearly there
is no hope for disproving T1 on empirical grounds if one is doing science in a T2-world. One might
also consider ordinary quantum mechanics as T2 and Bohmian mechanics, which need not enforce the
quantum equilibrium condition, as T1. A third example takes T2 to be Newtonian gravity and T1 to be
Cartan’s variant of it using a space-time with a curved connection [Misner et al., 1973, Malament, 1995,
Norton, 1999, Norton, 2008]; the difference between these theories strikes me as rather more significant
than it seems to Norton.
Clearly, much depends on how common and interesting the models in T1 but not in T2 are. If most
interesting T1-worlds are also T2-worlds, then finding oneself in a T2-world will not even probabilistically
confirm T2 much over T1. There might, however, be a sense in which T1 would be noticeably disconfirmed
for a scientist in a T2 world if T2 worlds are only a small portion of the worlds of T1. Anthropic
considerations might also be relevant if embodied scientists could not exist in some worlds: embodied
scientists will certainly not discover that models incompatible with the existence of embodied scientists
are realized in nature.
A second kind of modal near-equivalence could arise if each theory has some models not in the
other theory, along with some shared models. For example, GR with global hyperbolicity and GR with
asymptotic flatness (such as can obtain for localized sources [Wald, 1984]) share some models, while each
theory has models that the other lacks.
A third kind of near-equivalence arises if every model in T2 is diffeomorphic to part, but perhaps not
all, of a model of T1. Some of the most obvious examples, such as might posit that the world began
5 minutes ago or even 6000 years ago, or that certain objects exist only intermittently, while otherwise
agreeing with conventional history, might seem contrived (but see Kukla for a discussion of the problem of
scientific disregard for bizarre theories [Kukla, 1998]). In fact examples of the phenomenon of a theory’s
having a model that is a proper part of a model of a related theory, need not be of the “ad hoc cut-
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and-paste variety” [Earman, 1996, p. 630], to use Earman’s phrase. One example is the spin 2 route to
Einstein equations (cited above) with the background metric taken seriously [Pitts and Schieve, 2004] as
T2, while geometrical GR is T1. For example, for the Reissner-Nordstro¨m solution for charged spherically
symmetric masses in the non-extremal (Q2 < M2) case, it appears to be possible to include the region
between the outer and inner horizons, but impossible to include the region within the inner horizon, while
taking the flat background metric’s null cone seriously as a bound for the effective curved metric. Thus the
realistic spin 2 approach to Einstein’s equations has a solution that lacks a piece present in the geometrical
approach—albeit a piece that one is not likely to miss. A second example takes GR in terms of a metric
as T2 and GR in terms of the Ashtekar variables including a connection and a densitized spatial triad,
which permit a degenerate metric (that is, with vanishing determinant) [Jacobson and Romano, 1992],
as T1.
All of these kinds of empirical near-equivalence have the property that there is no experiment that
can be performed in both theories and such that the results disagree, but they give different lists of
physically possible worlds. While these sorts of examples merit philosophers’ attention, I will set them
aside to focus on a less recondite phenomenon. However, the phenomenon in question, taken from particle
physics, requires comparison not of two theories as is customary, but of one theory and a one-parameter
family of rivals.
3 Approximate Empirical Equivalence
There is a kind of empirical near-equivalence that is considerably weaker in some respects, involving
differences in occurrent properties in similar events in similar models of the compared theories, and
yet implying permanent rather than merely transient underdetermination. It has seemed at least a
priori unlikely to some noted physicists that satisfactory physical theories would be isolated, rather
than obtainable as limiting cases of a one- (or more) parameter family of theories characterized, for
example, by various particle masses [von Seeliger, 1895, Neumann, 1896, Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955,
Boulware and Deser, 1972, Babak and Grishchuk, 2003]. Particle masses are related to the range of the
relevant potential, where the range is a distance scale 1
m
over which a potential of the form 1
r
e−mr has
the exponential decay factor decay by 1
e
[Jackson, 1975, p. 598]. (Recall that the ‘speed of light’ c and
reduced Planck’s constant h¯ are set to 1 whenever needed.) For m = 0 the interaction is said to have
long or infinite range, as both electromagnetism and gravity are typically held to have.
Perhaps more to the point than the question about whether theories should be so isolated is the
question why our theorizing about the physical world, given our finite empirical knowledge, should single
out just one out of a variety of viable theories with differing particle masses? While Neumann and
Seeliger, writing in the 1890s, certainly did not have the concept of particle masses in mind—the link
between particle mass and range of the interaction would come later [de Broglie, 1924, Yukawa, 1935,
Kobzarev and Okun, 1968]—the underdetermination point and (especially with Neumann) the expo-
nential form that would later be related to particle masses were already available. Seeliger writes (as
translated by Norton) that Newton’s law was “a purely empirical formula and assuming its exactness
would be a new hypothesis supported by nothing.” [von Seeliger, 1895, Norton, 1999].
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Empirically, the photon mass is constrained to be rather small by ordinary standards
[Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971, Luo et al., 2003, Tu et al., 2005, Goldhaber and Nieto, 2010], less than
10−50 grams. This bound is close enough to 0 for most practical purposes. However, this mass, not
being dimensionless, is not close to 0 in a mathematical sense. It is doubtful that there is a nonarbitrary
sense in which one can say truly that the empirical evidence makes it probable that photon mass is zero.
(A Bayesian effort will be entertained below.) The question of the photon mass (or the range of the
gravitational potential) counts as a natural example, rather than cultured or artificial (to use Norton’s
classification, based on that for pearls [Norton, 2008]). The contest, however, is not best framed in terms
of a pair of theories, because of the infinite possibilities for the range of the gravitational potential or the
value of the photon mass.
The idea of exploring whether a massive theory could work in place of a massless one (or vice versa),
much as Seeliger proposed, is a commonplace in particle physics. The massless vs. massive competition
is an especially interesting and well motivated example of the fact, noted by Pierre Duhem, that the
curve fitting problem applies in physics. Two consecutive section headings from the rather familiar
part II, chapter 5 make the point: “A Law of Physics Is, Properly Speaking, neither True nor False
but Approximate” and “Every Law of Physics Is Provisional and Relative because It Is Approximate”
[Duhem, 1954, pp. 168, 172]. There are many ways that a given body of data can be fit by a theoretical
formula, but Duhem expects that generally a choice of one option will be made. However, the competition
between massive and massless theories is generally a competition in which both competitors are taken
seriously by physicists until reason to the contrary is found.
One can therefore define the relevant concept of approximate empirical equivalence employed here
to motivate a novel sort of underdetermination. The key point is that the empirical equivalence is not
merely approximate, and hence perhaps temporary; rather, the empirical equivalence is arbitrarily close
and hence permanent. Let {(∀m)Tm} be a collection of theories labeled by a parameter m, where all
positive values of m are permitted. (One can admit a positive upper bound for m, but that change makes
no difference.) Let T0 be another theory of the same phenomena. If the empirical predictions of the family
{(∀m)Tm} tend to those of T0 in the limit m→ 0, then the family {(∀m)Tm} empirically approximates
T0 arbitrarily closely. Though T0 is empirically distinguishable in principle from any particular element
Ti of {(∀m)Tm}, yielding merely transient underdetermination between any two theories, T0 is not
empirically distinguishable from the entire family. At any stage of empirical inquiry, there are finite
uncertainties regarding the empirical phenomena. If T0 presently fits the data, then so do some members
of {(∀m)Tm} for nonzero but sufficiently small m. While scientific progress can tighten the bounds on
m towards 0, human finitude prevents the bounds from being tightened to the point that all nonzero
values of m are excluded while T0 is admitted. Thus for any stage of empirical science, there will be
underdetermination between T0 and elements of {(∀m)Tm} with m close enough to 0, if T0 is still viable.
The underdetermination between T0 and part of {(∀m)Tm} is in this sense permanent. One can never
exclude empirically all the Tm theories with m > 0.
This sort of approximate empirical equivalence has a major advantage over exact empirical equiv-
alence, namely, that a foe of underdetermination cannot avoid the rivalry by identifying the rivals as
formulations of the same theory—except perhaps by an extreme verificationism going beyond the mature
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form of logical empiricism. The theory Tm for some specific nonzero m is clearly a distinct theory from
T0, incompatible with T0, making different predictions from T0.
4 Approximate Empirical Equivalence in Scalar Gravity:
The Neglected Rivalry
Before addressing the question of the photon mass, it is helpful to consider an analogous simpler question
regarding the range of gravitation, which arose in the 19th century for Newtonian gravity, should have
arisen for relativistic scalar gravity (but did not in a timely way), and arose in the late 1930s for theories
related to General Relativity. With the development of Special Relativity it became evident that a
relativistic theory of gravity was needed. Clearly the instantaneous action at a distance in Newton’s
theory did not agree with Special Relativity. A local field theory would be ideal. Eventually, with some
help from Einstein, Gunnar Nordstro¨m had a satisfactory scalar theory [Renn and Schemmel, 2007], at
least prior to the observed bending of light. This theory was fully in accord with Special Relativity, in
the sense of being a local field theory with (at least) invariance under the Poincare´ group of translations
and Lorentz boosts and rotations—though in fact the group is larger, as will appear shortly. Einstein
and Fokker expressed this theory in a more geometrical form, so that it yielded an effectively curved
spacetime that was conformally flat [Einstein and Fokker, 1914]. In other words, the light cones reflecting
the speed of light in Special Relativity were not affected, but the gravitational potential deformed the
volume element of spacetime.
Developments in group theory as applied to relativistic quantum mechanics from the 1930s, such as
by Wigner [Wigner, 1939], classified fields in terms of representations of the Lorentz group with various
masses and various spins. Relativistic massive scalar fields, if non-interacting, satisfy the Klein-Gordon
equation. Given particle physicists’ taxonomy in terms of mass and spin, it is natural to look for and
to fill in the blanks by considering all the possibilities. (Apart from particle physics, it is easy to fail to
notice the gap, which is in fact what generally happened.) Thus when one considers a massless scalar
theory of gravity, such as Nordstro¨m’s, it is natural to consider a massive variant and to ascertain whether
the massless limit of the massive theory is smooth. If it is, then the massive variant serves as a rival to
the massless theory.
Discussions of Nordstro¨m’s scalar gravity, a serious competitor to Einstein’s program for some years
during the middle 1910s, are said to have shown that even scalar gravity showed the inability of Special
Relativity (SR) to accommodate gravitation [Misner et al., 1973, p. 179] [Norton, 1992]. Nordstro¨m’s
theory indeed has a merely conformally flat space-time geometry [Einstein and Fokker, 1914], which one
can write as
gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 , (3)
where ηˆµν (with determinant −1) determines the light cones just as if for a flat metric in SR. Nordstro¨m’s
theory is invariant under the 15-parameter conformal group rather than just the 10-parameter Poincare´
group standard in SR, whereas massive variants of Nordstro¨m’s theory are merely Poincare´-invariant and
hence special relativistic in the strict sense. As it happens, massive variants of Nordstro¨m’s theory were
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never proposed in a timely way, and indeed not at all (to my knowledge) until one version was proposed,
unwittingly, in 1968 [Freund and Nambu, 1968, Deser and Halpern, 1970] using universal coupling to the
trace of the total stress-energy tensor. Elsewhere I have shown that there is, at least, a one-parameter
family of such theories [Pitts, 2011]. While the kinetic term is just that of Nordstro¨m’s theory, the mass
terms can be written in terms of an effective volume element
√−g, which contains the gravitational
potential, and also (in the mass term only) the undistorted volume element
√−η of the flat metric. For
any nonzero real w (including w = 1 and w = 0 by l’Hoˆpital’s rule), a universally coupled massive variant
of Nordstro¨m’s theory is given by
Lmass = m
2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−gw√−η1−w
w(1−w) −
√−η
w
]
. (4)
One can express this mass term as a quadratic term in the potential (naturally) and, typically, a series
of higher powers using the expansion
√−gw = √−ηw+8w√piGγ˜, where γ˜ is the gravitational potential;
note that γ˜ means something different for each value of w. (The case w = 0 can be treated by taking the
1
w
th root of this field redefinition; the limit gives an exponential function akin to that used in Kraichnan’s
work on scalar gravity [Kraichnan, 1955].) The result is
Lmass = −m2
[
γ˜2
2
√−η2w−1
+
(1− 2w)4√piGγ˜3
3
√−η3w−1
+ . . .
]
. (5)
This one-parameter family of theories closely resembles the 2-parameter Ogievetsky-Polubarinov family
of massive tensor theories [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Ogievetskii and Polubarinov, 1966], which
can also be derived in a similar fashion [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. The case w = 1
2
, which conveniently
terminates at quadratic order, is the Freund-Nambu theory [Freund and Nambu, 1968]. To facilitate
comparing apples to apples, rather than apples to oranges, one can use the w = 0 theory’s exponential
field redefinition
√−g = exp(8√piGγ)√−η for every value of w, obtaining
Lmass = m
2
√−η
64piG
[we8γ
√
piG − e8wγ
√
piG + 1− w]
w(w − 1)
= −m
2
√−η
64piG
∞∑
j=2
(8γ
√
piG)j
j!
j−2∑
i=0
wi. (6)
The concepts needed for massive scalar gravity were already available in the 1910s. That is due espe-
cially to Neumann and Seeliger’s modification of Newtonian gravity in the 1890s with an exponentially
decaying potential [Neumann, 1896, von Seeliger, 1896, Pauli, 1921, North, 1965, Norton, 1999]. To find
a massive relativistic scalar gravity theory, one only needed to do to Nordstro¨m’s theory what they had
done to Newton’s. The mathematics was available in the 1910s or 1920s as well [Cotton, 1898, Finzi, 1903,
Fubini, 1905, Weyl, 1918, Finzi, 1922, Schouten, 1921, Struik, 1922, Schouten, 1924, Levi-Civita, 1926]:
one needs two metrics, one of which is flat, the other being conformally related to it. It is simply an
accident of history that relativistic massive Nordstro¨m scalar gravity was not proposed in the 1910s, or
at least the 1920s when the Klein-Gordon equation appeared.
Had massive scalar gravity been proposed at that time, the history of 20th century space-time the-
ory would have been different in noteworthy ways, because moves that seemed plausible or inevitable
13
would have been recognized as merely optional or plausible, respectively. The infinite range/massless
cases of Newton and Nordstro¨m are geometrizable. The equations for Newton’s theory can be recast
(perhaps with change of content) in terms of a curious but sophisticated geometrical form with the
gravitational field absorbed into the connection [Misner et al., 1973, Earman and Friedman, 1973]. The
geometrizability of Nordstro¨m’s theory in terms of conformally flat Riemannian geometries was noted
above [Einstein and Fokker, 1914]. In both cases one learns something important about arguably surplus
structure in the theory. One should not immediately conclude that one has also learned something about
the world, about gravitation itself, however.
In contrast with the massless (infinite range) cases, massive (finite range) scalar gravities are not ge-
ometrizable. For Neumann-Seeliger nonrelativistic gravity, the gravitational potential cannot be fully ab-
sorbed into the connection. The rather large symmetry group of Newtonian gravity [Misner et al., 1973]
is thus reduced to the Galilean group. The relativistic massive scalar theories involve both the con-
formally flat metric gµν = ηˆµν
√−g 12 of Nordstro¨m’s theory (as geometrized by Einstein and Fokker
[Einstein and Fokker, 1914]) and the flat metric ηµν = ηˆµν
√−η 12 of SR, as is obvious from the
mass terms above (and the suppressed kinetic term). The symmetry group is thus reduced from
the conformal group to the Poincare´ group. The two metrics’ conformal parts determining the null
cones are of course identical. Because there are two metrics present, one has a good argument for
the conventionality of geometry, of a sort entertained in advance by Poincare´ [Poincare´, 1913, pp.
88, 89] [Ben-Menahem, 2001, Freund et al., 1969, Sexl, 1970], as opposed to Eddington’s empiricism
[Eddington, 1920, Eddington, 1928]: there just is not any specific fact of the matter about what metrical
geometry is yielded by experiments that are sensitive to the gravitational mass term. (The modal scope
of Poincare´’s argument is broader than just one’s favorite theory, such as GR, to which Eddington ap-
pealed. One does not want a philosophy of geometry to impart a spurious necessity to contingent facts
about our best current theory [Norton, 1993, pp. 848, 849].) For the same reasons, strong versions of
the equivalence principle are not admissible: manifestly inertia and gravitation are not the same phe-
nomenon, because inertia is represented by the background structures, whereas gravity is unambiguously
represented by the gravitational potential.
It is noteworthy, then, how excessive attention to the equivalence principle and geometrization tends
to render empirical rivals to Newton’s or Einstein’s theories inconceivable: having insisted on a sparse
geometrical ontology in formulating these theories, one lacks the resources to construct rival theories. It
is then all too easy to regard the theories in question as inevitable, the wave of the future, an assured
result of modern progress, or the like. But it is only the empirical fact of the bending of light by
gravity, not any inherent conceptual defect, that made it impossible to treat gravity adequately as a
special relativistic theory of a massive scalar field. Relativistic gravitation as such does not burst the
bounds of Special Relativity by having a larger symmetry group, contrary to claims that have been made
([Misner et al., 1973, Norton, 1992]). While the mass term (and hence the missing part of the structure
of Minkowski space-time) is not demonstrably necessary, it is certainly permitted.
Had Nordstro¨m’s theory still been viable by the time that Wigner’s classification of Lorentz group
representations in terms of mass and spin was widely known, it seems certain that massive scalar gravity
would have been considered. Its neglect until 1968 [Freund and Nambu, 1968], if not the present (with
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the partial exception of works by Dehnen and collaborators [Dehnen et al., 1990], which, however, are
focussed only on certain kinds of matter fields, and not fluids, for example), is one of the many dis-
advantages from the well known [Rovelli, 2002] gulf between general relativists and particle physicists.
(Helping to overcome this neglect is one reason for attending to the particle physics view of Einstein’s
equations above.) Massive scalar gravity is an unusual but interesting instance of an interacting massive
scalar theory. Massive scalar (spin 0) theories have a smooth massless limit, not only classically, but also
under quantization [Weinberg, 1995, p. 246]. The precedent that should have been noticed for massive
scalar gravity suggests by analogy that one could consider massive tensor gravity as well.
In the actual contingent history (as opposed to a rationally reconstructed one [Lakatos, 1970]), Ein-
stein was unaware of Seeliger’s work until after the final GR field equations were known [Einstein, 1996,
p. 420] [Einstein, 1998, p. 557] [Einstein, 2002a, pp. 142, 146] [Einstein, 2002b, p. 189]. When
he did discuss the idea in 1917 (not yet aware of Seeliger’s work) [Einstein, 1923], he drew an
analogy between massive scalar gravity and his cosmological constant term, but a spurious one
[Trautman, 1965, Freund et al., 1969, Treder, 1968, Norton, 1999, Harvey and Schucking, 2000] —an er-
ror that many would repeat in future years, spawning repeated corrections. The cosmological constant
introduces a zeroth order term, not just a first order term, into the field equations. (This mistake may
have been diagnosed first by Otto Heckmann in 1942 [Heckmann, 1942, Harvey and Schucking, 2000],
but with little effect.) This false analogy tends to hide from view the possibility of a genuine analog to
massive scalar gravity, that is, massive tensor gravity, or massive GR more specifically. Massive GR will
reappear below.
5 Massive Spinor Fields: The Neutrino Case
Massive spinor (spin 1
2
) theories also have a smooth massless limit [Weinberg, 1995, Deser, 1980]. Apart
from certain significant details, it was relatively straightforward to give up the traditional default as-
sumption of vanishing neutrino mass in favor of nonzero masses when doing so helped to resolve other
neutrino-related puzzles [Roy, 2000, Bilenky, 2010]. The fact that neutrinos are now believed to be mas-
sive, after having been assumed massless, makes the relevance of empirically permitted mass terms the
more evident.
6 Approximate Empirical Equivalence in Electromag-
netism
6.1 Proca Massive vs. Maxwell Massless Photons
It is not immediately obvious that the massless limit is smooth for vector (spin 1) fields, such as elec-
tromagnetism, but ultimately the limit is in fact smooth. This question of the photon mass can be
considered at both the classical and quantum levels, giving philosophically interesting test cases for ap-
proximate empirical equivalence. While the usual Maxwell electromagnetism has a massless photon (if
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one may follow the common practice of borrowing quantum terminology for classical contexts), it is
fairly well known that the massive Proca variants exist and approximate the massless theory arbitrarily
well for sufficiently small photon mass in both the classical [Jackson, 1975, Sundermeyer, 1982] and
quantum contexts [Belinfante, 1949, Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955, Stueckelberg, 1957, Boulware, 1970,
Slavnov, 1972, Shizuya, 1975, Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, Goldhaber and Nieto, 2010]. In thermal
contexts, where one might expect the third degree of freedom to be relevant, it decouples in the massless
limit, so that it takes forever to reach equilibrium; hence equilibrium thermodynamic quantities based
on three field degrees of freedom are physically irrelevant and unobservable [Bass and Schro¨dinger, 1955,
Goldhaber and Nieto, 1971].
Because Maxwell’s electromagnetism is empirically distinguishable from any particular Proca theory
(that is, with some given photon mass), and the various Proca theories with different photon masses are
also empirically inequivalent, there is no possibility of trivializing the rivalry by regarding the supposed
rivals as merely the same theory in different guises. However, for any set of observations with finite
precision—which is the only kind that human finitude permits at a given stage of inquiry—there exists a
range of sufficiently small photon masses such that the massive electromagnetic theories are empirically
indistinguishable from the massless theory. Furthermore, the difference between the massless theory and
the massive theories is quite deep conceptually, because only the massless theory has gauge freedom and
thus has field equations that mathematically underdetermine the fields’ time evolution (assuming that
the potential Aµ is used rather than the field strength Fµν), along the lines of the hole argument in GR.
(In comparison to GR [Earman and Norton, 1987], the analog of the hole argument for electromagnetism
is not a very difficult problem, because space-time point individuation is not at issue due to the purely
internal nature of the gauge transformations (lacking derivatives of the fields) and consequent ease of
finding the gauge-invariant observable field strength Fµν .) By the same token, the massive Proca theories
merely permit charge conservation (which typically holds as a consequence of the field equations for the
charged sources), whereas Maxwell’s theory enforces charge conservation and so can be coupled only to
conserved sources. Thus the contest between Maxwell’s massless electromagnetism and Proca’s massive
electromagnetisms provides a paradigm case of approximate empirical equivalence: a contest between
(or should one say, among) genuine rivals, which cannot be wholly resolved empirically, and on which
matters of considerable interest turn.
The most compact and perspicuous way to begin a technical discussion of a classical field theory is to
exhibit its Lagrangian density, a function of some fields and their derivatives, such that the space-time
integral of the Lagrangian density L, the “action” S of the theory, satisfies the principle of least (or
perhaps merely stationary) action. In simple mechanical cases, the Lagrangian is the kinetic energy
less the potential energy. The source-free Maxwell field equations (in manifestly Lorentz-covariant form)
follow from a Lagrangian density of the form
L = −1
4
FµνF
µν , (7)
where the indices are moved using the Lorentz metric diag(−1, 1, 1, 1), Fµν =def ∂µAν − ∂νAµ is the
electromagnetic field strength, ∂ takes the four-dimensional gradient, and repeated indices are summed
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from 0 (time) to 3. For Maxwell’s theory, the vector potential Aµ admits the gauge transformation
Aµ → Aµ + ∂µφ
for an arbitrary function φ; this transformation makes no observable difference. This Lagrangian density
is manifestly gauge invariant, because it is built from the gauge-invariant field strength only. For the
massive Proca electromagnetisms, the Lagrangian density is
Lp = −1
4
FµνF
µν − m
2
2
AµA
µ. (8)
Evidently the A2 term breaks the gauge symmetry in the massive case. The resulting Euler-Lagrange
field equations are
∂L
∂Aµ
− ∂ν ∂L
∂(∂νAµ)
= ∂νF
νµ −m2Aµ = 0. (9)
Whereas Maxwell’s theory has 2 degrees of freedom at each spatial point (written as 2∞3 degrees of
freedom), Proca’s theories have 3∞3 degrees of freedom. The extra degree of freedom (at each point),
however, is weakly coupled for small photon masses and so is not readily noticed experimentally. The
treatment of the two theories (or theory types) using the Dirac-Bergmann constrained dynamics formal-
ism is straightforward [Sundermeyer, 1982]. The approximate empirical equivalence between Maxwell’s
theory and Proca’s theories for small enough photon masses is preserved under quantization: massive
quantum electrodynamics (QED) approximates the standard massless QED arbitrarily well, as noted
above. It follows that in a world with electromagnetism as the only force, it would be impossible for
finite beings to rule out all of the massive electromagnetic theories empirically, and thus impossible to
determine empirically whether gauge freedom was a fundamental feature of the electromagnetic laws.
Here I am forgetting about the Stueckelberg formulation [Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, Pitts, 2009],
which shows that gauge freedom per se is not even distinctive of massless electromagnetism: one can
have gauge freedom and a photon mass term, unless one bans certain extra gauge compensation fields.
The Stueckelberg mass term takes the form −m2
2
(Aµ − ∂µψ)(Aµ − ∂µψ). A gauge transformation of Aµ
is compensated by changing ψ: Aµ → Aµ + ∂µχ, ψ → ψ + χ. The Stueckelberg formulation raises a new
set of questions involving exactly rather than approximately empirically equivalent theories, and so will
not be discussed here.
A relevant distinction between massive classical electromagnetism and massive quantum electrody-
namics pertains to the tendency of classically fixed parameters to acquire quantum corrections. Classi-
cally one might take the photon mass to be an arbitrary parameter, handed down from above and not
susceptible to explanation, but only to empirical determination. However, in quantum field theory, a
small nonzero bare photon mass might acquire large corrections, whereas a vanishing photon mass is
forced to stay vanishing by gauge invariance. Thus in massive quantum electrodynamics, the smallness
of the photon mass seems to call for explanation, but no explanation (other than fine tuning) is available.
6.2 Bayesian Treatment of the Photon Mass
One might consider whether Bayesian confirmation theory has the resources to say something useful
about the problem at hand. For example, can one show that the probability that a Proca theory is true
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goes to zero as the upper bound on the photon mass goes to zero?3 Answering this question requires some
discussion of plausible prior probabilities for various values of the photon mass. The massless photon case
is special, special enough that it deserves a finite probability all by itself. Presumably no nonzero value
of the photon mass is special, except for those comparable to the upper bound on the photon mass at
a given stage of empirical progress. Assigning real-valued probabilities to maximally specific hypotheses
about the photon mass, other than the massless case, is problematic [Swinburne, 1973]; this problem will
be addressed here informally by taking probability density as basic. Thus there is a mixture of discrete
and continuous values. One can handle the massless case by including a Dirac delta function term bδ(m)
in the probability density, where b is some positive number less than 2; one recalls that integrating the
right half of δ(m) gives 1
2
rather than 1. It is somewhat less clear what form the distribution should
take for finite values of the photon mass m (apart from being effectively 0 much past the experimental
bounds).
When somewhat similar problems in particle physics (but without bδ(m) at 0) have been treated by
Bayesian means—which treatment seems to be rather rare—it has been proposed that the probability
density function does not matter terribly much, as long as one avoids cases that strongly favor values
near 0 [D’Agostini, 1995, pp. 54-56]. Thus a uniform distribution over some finite interval of mass, a
triangular distribution bounded above by a downward-sloped straight line, and a half-Gaussian peaked
at 0 gave comparable results. A distribution sharply favoring values near zero, on the other hand, was
judged to give “ridiculous” results [D’Agostini, 1995, p. 56]. (Note that this is not the value 0 itself,
which I give a Dirac δ spike.) For the photon mass case, it is visually obvious what happens, at least for
distributions not strongly favoring values near 0 (leaving aside the bδ(m) term). New experiments tighten
the bounds on the photon mass, chopping off the right end (larger m) of the probability distribution and
scaling up the remainder. The δ(m) term gets scaled up but never chopped. Thus sufficiently vigorous
Bayesian updating will concentrate arbitrarily much of the probability in the δ(m) term representing
the massless case, leaving the probability that one or another Proca theory is true to approach 0 as the
photon mass’s upper bound goes to 0. If, on the other hand, one chooses a prior probability distribution
for the photon mass which does favor small nonzero values heavily, then Bayesian updating will be all
the less effective in undermining commitment to massive photons. Insofar as one can justify not favoring
small nonzero photon masses in the prior probability—a question perhaps worthy of more attention—it
follows that a series of experiments driving the photon mass bound toward 0 would likewise drive the
probability that a Proca theory is true to 0.
Whether this result is very significant in practice is open to question, however. It provides a diachronic
rationality constraint on degrees of belief in the Proca family for a Bayesian agent who lives long enough
to see arbitrarily strict bounds placed on the photon mass. But human finitude and perhaps other factors
might well ensure that we cannot, even over generations of scientists, drive the bound below some certain
finite value. Thus the arbitrariness in the prior probability might well fail to wash out. One reason might
be the energy-time uncertainty relation in conjunction with the age of the universe, from which some
estimate a lower measurability bound of roughly 10−66g [Tu et al., 2005]. It is not clear whether one’s
degree of belief today that the photon has a nonzero mass ought to be on the order of .55 or 10−5, though
3I thank a referee for asking this question.
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few would opt for .55 nowadays. With the serious possibility that progress in tightening the bounds on
the photon mass must cease eventually, qualitatively the same situation (with still more reluctance to
accept values near .55, assuming that a nonzero mass is not detected) might plausibly still exist in 500
years. It appears that Bayesianism’s ability to formulate interesting questions here perhaps outstrips
human ability to answer them.
6.3 Possible Inductive Lessons about Underdetermination in Particle
Physics
Whereas the massive scalar and massive spinor cases gave no problems in taking the massless limit, care
was needed to achieve the same result for the vector case instantiated by Proca’s electromagnetism. A
smooth massless limit does obtain, however. Having pondered these cases for spin 0, spin 1
2
, and spin
1, one might be tempted by induction to draw some philosophical morals, especially if one is unmoved
with surprise by the smallness of the photon mass in massive quantum electrodynamics. Three seemingly
plausible morals are:
1. generically there are rival theories that will remain empirically indistinguishable no matter how
far empirical inquiry advances, despite the fact that the rival theories give contradictory answers
for the same experiment, because theories with slightly different particle masses (or perhaps other
parameters) are available.
2. theories that are nearly empirically equivalent classically remain so under quantization, so empirical
equivalence is stable under the change of auxiliary hypotheses from classical to quantum.
3. drawing theoretical conclusions to the effect that gauge freedom (and hence mathematical indeter-
minism) is present in the physics of the real world is inadvisable, because contemporary physical
theories offer a choice between Maxwell’s electromagnetism, a gauge theory with indeterministic
equations for Aµ, and Proca’s theories with deterministic equations and no gauge freedom.
Doubtless it is inadvisable in general to invest heavily in metaphysical results that are fragile under small
changes in physical theory. One should pause to feel the force of these lessons and develop appropriate
expectations for their fulfillment in more advanced contexts. (This corresponds roughly to learning some
of the lessons of particle physics into the early 1960s.) Then one can be appropriately surprised when
the lessons appear to fail for more complicated theories.
7 No Approximate Equivalence in Yang-Mills Theories?
In the early days of Gauge Theory, it was thought that local gauge-invariance could be an
‘approximate’ symmetry. Perhaps one could add mass terms for the vector field that violate
local symmetry, but make the model look more like the observed situation in particle physics.
We now know, however. . . . [’t Hooft, 2007, p. 688]
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It turns out that all three of the above lessons might well be hasty,4 because matters are much more
complicated for both Yang-Mills fields (used for the theories of the weak and strong nuclear forces) and
gravity. In both cases most of the relevant results appeared in the early 1970s, though they have generally
escaped discussion among philosophers. Among other reasons that the three lessons are perhaps too hasty,
it turns out that quantization can be dangerous to the health of massive theories. The preservation of
approximate empirical equivalence between the massive and massless cases of electromagnetism under
quantization is something of an accident due to the theories’ simplicity, as appears in consideration of
the Yang-Mills and gravitational cases from work in the early 1970s.
In particular, quantized massive Yang-Mills theory differs from the massless theory even in the limit of
vanishing mass [Slavnov and Faddeev, 1971, Slavnov, 1972]; the m → 0 limit disagrees with the m = 0
theory by a finite amount in certain observable predictions. Moreover, quantized massive Yang-Mills
theory is either non-unitary or not power-counting renormalizable [Wong, 1971, Delbourgo et al., 1988,
Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004, ’t Hooft, 2007]. The massive Yang-Mills theories envisioned are those
with a traditional mass term of the form
− m
2
2
AiµA
iµ,
which breaks the gauge symmetry in an explicit fashion. This is not the now-standard Higgs mechanism
[Weinberg, 1996, Smeenk, 2006, Lyre, 2008] for giving an effective mass and finite range to the weak
nuclear force by spontaneous symmetry breaking, by which an interaction between the Yang-Mills vector
bosons and the Higgs scalars, after a field redefinition to measure the scalars with respect to a true energy
minimum and another field redefinition (in the form of a rotation in abstract space of the vector poten-
tials by the weak mixing angle) yields an effective mass term for the Yang-Mills bosons. Nonunitarity is
disastrous because negative probabilities seem unintelligible. The lack of power-counting renormalizabil-
ity seems less disastrous to some authors nowadays [Weinberg, 1995] than it once did: one settles for an
effective rather than fundamental theory and thus admits that the theory at hand works only up to some
definite energy range, after which further terms would be required. Under quantization, the massive
Proca electromagnetic theories escape this painful dilemma merely because their mathematical simplic-
ity as Abelian gauge theories (that is, with a gauge group in which the order of two transformations
makes no difference to the result), apart from the mass term that breaks the gauge symmetry, excludes a
troublesome term that appears in the non-Abelian Yang-Mills case [Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004]. Elec-
tromagnetism is thus too simple a theory to exhibit the dangers that quantization poses to the health
of field theories; its atypical simplicity renders it an insufficiently demanding test-bed for philosophical
morals of the sort suggested above.
This phenomenon involving Yang-Mills theories exemplifies or resembles Laudan and Leplin’s notion
of instability of empirical equivalence under change of auxiliary hypotheses [Laudan and Leplin, 1991,
Leplin, 1997]. Yang-Mills and massive Yang-Mills field theories are approximately empirically equivalent
classically, but this equivalence appears to be violated at the quantum level. If there is an essence of
Yang-Mills theories that can be exemplified in either classical or quantum form, then one can take this
example as a literal instance rather than mere analogy to Laudan and Leplin’s phenomenon, which is
4I thank Ikaros Bigi for illuminating discussions and advice on these matters.
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cast in terms of logically conjoined theories and hypotheses.
8 Approximate Equivalence in Electroweak Theory: Yang-
Mills Theory with Essentially Abelian Sector
The underdetermination between the quantized Maxwell theory and the lower-mass quantized Proca
theories is permanent (at least unless a photon mass is detected, in which case Proca wins). It does
not immediately follow that our best science leaves the photon mass unspecified apart from empirical
bounds, however. Electromagnetism can be unified with an SU(2) Yang-Mills field describing the weak
nuclear force into the electroweak theory (see, for example, [Weinberg, 1996]). The resulting electroweak
unification of course is not simply a logical conjunction of the electromagnetic and weak theories; the the-
ories undergoing unification are modified in the process (c.f. [Kukla, 1998], chapter 4). Maxwell’s theory
can participate in this unification; can Proca theories participate while preserving renormalizability and
unitarity? Probably they can [Cornwall et al., 1974a, Cornwall et al., 1974b, Calogeracos et al., 1981,
Ignatiev and Joshi, 1996, Du¨tsch and Schroer, 2000, Ruegg and Ruiz-Altaba, 2004]. Thus evidently the
underdetermination between Maxwell and Proca persists even in electroweak theory, though this unre-
solved rivalry is not widely noticed. There is some non-uniqueness in the photon mass term, partly due
to the rotation by the weak mixing angle between the original fields in the SU(2)× U(1) group and the
mass eigenstates after spontaneous symmetry breaking. Thus the physical photon is not simply the field
corresponding to the original U(1) group, contrary to naive expectations. There are also various empiri-
cally negligible but perhaps conceptually important effects that can arise in such theories. Among these
are charge dequantization—the charges of charged particles are no longer integral multiples of a smallest
charge—and perhaps charge non-conservation. Crucial to the possibility of including a Proca-type mass
term (as opposed to merely getting mass by spontaneous symmetry breaking) is the non-semi-simple
nature of the gauge group SU(2)×U(1): this group has a subgroup U(1) that is Abelian and that com-
mutes with the whole of the larger group. Were the electroweak theory to be embedded in some larger
semi-simple group such as SU(5), then no Proca mass term could be included [Calogeracos et al., 1981].
The dependence of this outcome and others recently discussed on involved physical calculations shows
that these are not examples of theories for which empirical equivalence can be demonstrated by a brief
argument in a philosophy of science paper—examples which have been a target of Norton’s critique
[Norton, 2008].
9 Is There Approximate Equivalence for Gravity? General
Relativity and Its Massive Variants
If Yang-Mills theories qualify the three supposed lessons mentioned above, so that they fail for mass
terms for non-Abelian Yang-Mills theories but perhaps do hold for the Abelian sector of non-semi-
simple Yang-Mills theories such as the electroweak theory, the still greater complication of GR ren-
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ders the three lessons even more contingent upon detailed physical calculation. After a lull from
the mid-70s, there has been since the mid-90s a large and growing literature on massive gravities
[Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Freund et al., 1969, Boulware and Deser, 1972, Vainshtein, 1972,
Visser, 1998, Deffayet et al., 2002, Babak and Grishchuk, 2003, Petrov, 2004, Pitts and Schieve, 2007,
Zinoviev, 2007], much of it addressing whether they approach (local) empirical equivalence with Ein-
stein’s equations in the massless limit and are theoretically healthy, even at the classical level. A widely
held view since the early 1970s poses a dilemma [Boulware and Deser, 1972, Tyutin and Fradkin, 1972]
asserting that massive gravities either have 5∞3 degrees of freedom (spin 2) and do not agree
with Einstein’s equations in the massless limit due to the van Dam-Veltman-Zakharov discontinuity
[van Dam and Veltman, 1970, van Dam and Veltman, 1972, Zakharov, 1970], or they have 6∞3 degrees
of freedom (spin 2 and spin 0) and agree empirically with Einstein’s theory in the massless limit (at least
classically), but are theoretically unhealthy and physically unstable because the spin 0 field has negative
kinetic energy.
Whereas the Proca theory is the unique local linear massive variant of Maxwell’s electromagnetism,
the most famous massive gravity with 6∞3 degrees of freedom, the Freund-Maheshwari-Schonberg mas-
sive gravity [Freund et al., 1969, Boulware and Deser, 1972], is just one member (albeit the best in some
respects) of a 2-parameter family of massive theories of gravity [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965], all
of which satisfy universal coupling [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Adding a mass term involves adding a term
quadratic in the potential; higher-order (cubic, quartic, etc.) self-interaction terms might also be present.
The nonlinearity of the Einstein tensor implies, in contrast to the electromagnetic case, that there is
no obviously best choice for defining the gravitational potential. While any such definition requires a
background metric ηµν in order that the potential vanish when gravity is turned off (typically flat space-
time), thus making massive theories bimetric, one can still choose among gµν − ηµν , √−ggµν −√−ηηµν
(the best choice for some purposes), gµν − ηµν , and so on, as well as various nonlinear choices such as
gµαη
αβgβν − ηµν and the like [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965, Boulware and Deser, 1975]. In some
cases the availability of nonlinear field redefinitions might make some expressions that look like mass
term + interaction term with one definition of the gravitational potential, appear as a pure quadratic
mass term with another definition; nonetheless the Einstein tensor remains nonlinear, no matter what
definition of the potential is used. By contrast, the linearity of the Maxwell field strength tensor makes
it natural to have a mass term that is also linear in Aµ in the field equations (and hence quadratic in Aµ
in the Lagrangian density). While one can explore introducing nonlinear algebraic terms in Aµ describ-
ing self-interactions in electromagnetism, such terms induce acausal propagation if not chosen carefully
[Shamaly and Capri, 1974].
Whether massive gravities are viable even at the classical level remains a matter of debate in the
physics literature. The majority view is that they are not, but this view has lost the near-consensus
status that it once had. Evidently intuitive expectations about the ease of constructing approximately
empirically equivalent theories to GR are threatened by devils in the details.
One possibility worthy of exploration is whether the methods of PT-symmetric quantization can help.
PT-symmetric quantization has exorcised the vicious ghosts thought to inhabit some theories according
to more traditional analyses [Mostafazadeh, 2005, Bender, 2007, Bender and Mannheim, 2008], though
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the resulting theories sometimes have surprising phenomenology. Might PT-symmetry be helpful for
massive gravity or for a prima facie non-unitary [Delbourgo et al., 1988] massive Yang-Mills theory?
It is also noteworthy that there are examples from fluid mechanics of theories with negative energy
modes that do not yield instability in an unphysical fashion; such theories have Hamiltonians that are
not of the typical separable form of a kinetic energy built from momenta plus a potential energy built
from generalized coordinates [Morrison, 1998]. Massive versions of GR have nonseparable Hamiltonians.
Thus it seems a bit quick to reject massive gravities simply because of a wrong-sign degree of freedom,
without more detailed analysis [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. The majority view’s reliance on first-order
perturbative arguments regarding a theory where nonlinearity in the Hamiltonian constraint should be
important, also might give one pause. The question seems to be not quite settled, therefore. The role
of such theories in assessing underdetermination is a worthwhile motive for pursuit, even if the odds are
somewhat long. Indeed, comparing the literature on massive gravity to works in plasma physics, where
negative energy degrees of freedom are routinely encountered, one notices among plasma physicists
much less tendency to reject such theories without detailed investigation. Plasma physicists do not
conclude, much less assume, that negative energy degrees of freedom are always automatically disastrous;
the demonstrable physical relevance of such theories in plasma physics does not permit rejecting such
theories automatically. Instead plasma physicists have developed criteria, including looking for resonances
and taking into account the magnitudes and signs of the modes in question, that indicate instability
[Weiland and Wilhelmsson, 1977].
Besides plasma physicists, mathematicians also study theories with positive and negative energy
degrees of freedom and fail to find generic instability [Berti, 2007]. Indeed various theorems have been
proven (for finitely many degrees of freedom) to the effect that, especially but not only in the absence
of resonances, periodic solutions tend to persist when small perturbations are made about theories with
periodic solutions; the absence of negative energy degrees of freedom is not assumed in some of these
theorems. It seems not to be expected that the situation becomes radically worse in field theories; the
question is a subject of current research. It is therefore doubtful that the issue of massive gravity was
settled in the early 1970s. Of course it might well be the case that massive gravities are unstable for
substantially the reasons usually mentioned; if there is perhaps no proof, there is certainly ground for
suspicion.
Besides the question of stability, massive gravities, being bimetric, are also susceptible to causality
problems if the relationship between the two metrics’ null cones is not correct; sometimes it is not, at
least not without help [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Though matter sees only the effective curved metric
and gravity only barely sees the flat background metric due to the smallness of the graviton mass, these
theories are only Lorentz-covariant (or covariant under the 15-parameter conformal group in the case
of massless spin 0). Thus the usual special relativistic arguments about superluminality in one frame
implying backwards causation in another frame are applicable. At the quantum level it would be awkward
at best to impose Lorentz-covariant equal-time commutation relations when there is no reason to expect
events that are space-like separated (with respect to the background metric) to be causally independent.
Such causality problems bear some resemblance to those encountered in the 1960s with spin 3
2
fields
[Velo and Zwanzinger, 1969]. Adding gauge freedom and then judiciously restricting it seems likely to
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cure the problem of acausality [Pitts and Schieve, 2007]. Massive variants of GR are of special interest
as foils for GR concerning general covariance [Pitts, 2009].
While the above discussions have aimed to survey longstanding issues in particle physics, there are
various recent developments also of interest. In recent years it has been found that if one is willing to
introduce a cosmological constant term, in effect using a background space-time of constant curvature,
then there are opportunities for a smooth massless limit for massive gravitation [Kogan et al., 2001].
Supergravity theories involve the existence of at least one field of spin 3
2
. There is also a discontinuity
in the massless limit for spin 3
2
vector-spinors [Deser et al., 1977]; more recently it was found that a
background of constant curvature can make the massless limit smooth [Deser and Waldron, 2001]. One
might take the view that such alternatives, by leaving the world of fields in flat space-time, are less simple,
and hence perhaps less probable or otherwise less worthy of attention than a case of underdetermination in
flat space-time would be. On the other hand there are recent surprising indications that highly symmetric
(N = 8) supergravity in four space-time dimensions is ultraviolet-finite (better than renormalizable) at
least to the fourth loop order [Bern et al., 2009] and perhaps to all orders, so spin 3
2
fields seem more
likely to exist in reality than they did previously. (This sort of work is a reminder that real scientific
progress can be made by humans in contexts that would not be a challenge for an ideal Bayesian agent,
who is logically and mathematically omniscient [Garber, 1983].) At any rate there is a lively current
literature on subtle moves that do or might yield a smooth massless limit even for some spins higher than
1, but a brief summary would be both difficult and premature. Discontinuity was found some time ago for
higher spin fields as well, such as spin 5
2
and spin 3 [Berends et al., 1979, Berends and van Reisen, 1980],
in case such fields really exist. String theory, at least, has a rich store of higher-spin fields. Rather
than aim for exhaustive discussion, this paper aims mainly to call attention to longstanding features of
particle physics that are relevant to underdetermination, while pointing the way toward a more active
philosophical engagement with such literature in the future.
10 Conclusion
The provisional character of some conclusions involving more complicated field theories indicates that in
these cases, whatever the ultimate outcomes, the physical details sometimes have important philosophical
consequences. These examples therefore do not provide strong support for claims that underdetermina-
tion is generic throughout science. They do, however, provide support for the claim that there might
well be interesting cases of permanent underdetermination, even in our contemporary best science, such
as the electroweak quantum field theory, as well as in simpler theories. The simpler the field theory, the
easier it is to have underdetermination. Higher-spin fields are more likely to involve either dangerous
wrong-sign degrees of freedom or a discontinuous massless limit.
Consideration of a variety of theories (and formulations thereof) of contemporary physical relevance
has yielded a variety of insights pertaining to the general philosophy of science. The question of empirical
equivalence and underdetermination of theories by data proves to have highly nontrivial examples, as well
as surprising failures, when one looks into classical and quantum field theory. Thus philosophers need not
rely on thin contrived examples. Particle physics is important for general philosophers of science, as well
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as space-time theorists; it is not just for philosophers of quantum mechanics. One can add these reasons
to Redhead’s list of reasons for philosophers to study quantum field theory [Redhead, 1980]. Comparing
some contemporary physical theories also suggests apparently novel sorts of underdetermination. There
is a surprising degree of dependence on the physical details, including difficult calculations in quantum
field theory, for approximate underdetermination. Underdetermination can be broken in surprising ways
when auxiliary hypotheses are changed, much as Laudan and Leplin have anticipated. The kinds of
underdetermination discussed here are immune to trivialization as just linguistic variants of the same
theory. Underdetermination might not be ubiquitous in contemporary particle physics, but there are
enough interesting examples and types of it that the subject remains of considerable interest.
There are plausible versions of scientific realism that are not threatened by the examples from particle
physics discussed here. For example, Ernan McMullin writes that
[t]he basic claim made by scientific realism . . . is that the long-term success of a scientific
theory gives reason to believe that something like the entities and structure postulated by
the theory actually exists. There are four important qualifications built into this: (1) the
theory must be successful over a significant period of time; (2) the explanatory success of the
theory gives some reason, though not a conclusive warrant, to believe it; (3) what is believed is
that the theoretical structures are something like the structure of the real world; (4) no claim
is made for a special, more basic, privileged form of existence for the postulated entities.
[footnote suppressed] These qualifications: “significant period,” “some reason,” “something
like,” sound very vague, of course, and vagueness is a challenge to the philosopher. Can they
not be made more precise? I am not sure that they can; efforts to strengthen the thesis of
scientific realism have . . . left it open to easy refutation. [McMullin, 1984]
On the other hand, one can imagine more ambitious sorts of scientific realism, to the effect that
rival theories will always be in principle empirically discriminable, and will be discriminated in the
not-too-distant future, that are threatened. A determined scientific realist of such an ambitious type
could respond to the cases from particle physics by noting that sometimes evidence has broken the
underdetermination, as in the neutrino and Yang-Mills cases and arguably the gravitational case, and that
these cases give some comfort to the expectation that either further facts or the instability of empirical
equivalence under change of auxiliaries will always ensure that empirically distinguishable predictions
be made. While such a response is possible, it appears to amount to an expectation of routinely being
mildly lucky. In some cases the underdetermination has indeed been resolved, but it is not at all clear
what motivates the determined scientific realist’s hope that it will always be resolvable, or resolvable on
a time scale that makes us reasonably close to learning the truth. It is difficult to think of a non-Hegelian
reason for expecting to be mildly lucky routinely in the required way. Presumably some sort of scalar
gravity could have been true, and gravity would not have bent light as in GR. The underdetermination
case for scalar gravity was not resolved, but merely bypassed; but what right would a scientific realist
have to expect such deliverance? The underdetermination case for the neutrino was resolved, but in
such a fashion that the widespread belief in massless neutrinos was rejected. If the scientific realist is
comforted by the thought that eventually the underdetermination was broken, there is also a warning
25
that a widely held assumption of masslessness has proved false. If the data speak, they might not do so
for a long time, during which interval widespread scientific belief might be mistaken. The electroweak
theory might well permit a mass term for the photon. Does the scientific realist have good reason to
expect a further unification using a group like SU(5) that blocks such a mass term?
The no-miracles argument for scientific realism will not help. It is evident that if a Proca theory
for small photon mass (or rather its quantum successor, here and following) is true, it is not a miracle
that Maxwell’s theory works so well; likewise if Maxwell’s theory is true, it is no miracle why Proca
theories with small photon masses work so well. The theories are sufficiently alike theoretically as well
as empirically; the no-miracles argument has already done its work. But what further reasons does
the optimistic scientific realist have? Routine good luck, though characteristic of the fictional life of
Inspector Clouseau, is just the sort of thing that it is not rational to expect in real life by ordinary (non-
Hegelian) inductive principles. One could perhaps fall back upon the principle that one philosopher’s
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, or the subjectivity of Bayesian prior probabilities, as licensing
rational intransigent commitment to certain strong forms of scientific realism. But surely one ought to
weigh the force of the examples from particle physics against the force of arguments for such optimistic
scientific realism. As I read particle physics, the weight of the examples of underdetermination above is
fairly strong. In any case one must read particle physics in order to ascertain the force of the examples
to be weighed.
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